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APPELLATE MALPRACTICE*
Steven Wisotsky**
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal malpractice is defined in terms of negligence,
although a suit for breach of contract is recognized as an
alternative action in some states.' Lawsuits against trial attorneys
for negligence are "governed by the same principles" that apply
in other actions for negligence.2 Similarly, appellate malpractice
is also based on negligence. It arises when a lawyer fails to
exercise a reasonable degree of skill and care in the appeal of a
client's case, causing injury to the client. Because the prospects
for success on appeal may be damaged by both trial and
appellate lawyers, both may be subject to malpractice claims
pertaining to issues of appellate review.
For the trial lawyer, an appellate-related malpractice claim
may arise from such errors or omissions as failure to preserve
the record for appeal; advising a client against taking an appeal
when it is warranted; or failing to timely file or perfect an appeal
when an appeal was the agreed upon course of action. For the
appellate lawyer, a claim may arise from mistakes made in
handling any aspect of the appeal itself.
In considering an action against a trial attorney or appellate
counsel, malpractice is not limited to litigation issues. Attorney
malpractice can and often does arise in transactional work as
* This article is based on Chapter 13 of the author's recently published treatise,
Professional Judgment on Appeal: Bringing and Opposing Appeals (Carolina Academic
Press 2002).
** Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University; A.B.
University of Pennsylvania, J.D. University of Miami, LL. M. Yale University.
1. See infra pt. VII.
2. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Price, 231 F. 397, 402 (4th Cir. 1916).
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well. "[R]edressable harm ... need not depend upon the
outcome of any litigation because the negligent preparation of [a
written instrument] could potentially be the cause of the
financial loss that the [clients] incurred in reforming the
[instrument]." 3 Malpractice may also arise from negligent acts
or omissions in negotiations surrounding litigation.4
II. STANDARD OF CARE
Legal malpractice claims may arise from a lawyer's failure
to exercise a reasonable standard of care in representing a client.
The standard of care that applies to appellate malpractice is the
degree of care and skill that a reasonable appellate lawyer from
the same community would exercise in handling the same type
of appeal, under the same rules, laws, and set of facts.5
Reasonableness should be measured at the time representation
was rendered, especially with regard to liability for decisions of
then novel or untested legal theories.6 "The general rule is that
an attorney may be held liable for ignorance of the rules of
practice, failure to comply with conditions precedent to suit, or
for his neglect to prosecute or defend an action." 7
"An attorney is never bound to exercise extraordinary
diligence, or act beyond the knowledge, skill, and ability
ordinarily possessed by members of the legal profession." 8 But
as specialization increases in the legal field, an attorney who
holds him or herself out to be a specialist must "exercise the
3. Porter v. Ogden, Newell & Welch, 241 F.3d 1334, 1340 (11th Cir. 2001).
4. See Smiley v. Manchester Ins. & Indemn. Co., 375 N.E.2d 118, 123 (111. 1978)
(holding liable a lawyer sued for failure to make a settlement offer that his client
authorized). The failure resulted in a liability judgment in excess of the policy limit. The
plaintiff's expert witness, a local lawyer, testified that it was unreasonable for a lawyer not
to have made such an offer, and that the lawyer failed to exercise the degree of reasonable
care usually exercised by other lawyers in the area. The court held that in view of the
authority of the lawyer to settle, and because he never made the offer, his inaction was the
proximate cause of the client's excessive liability. Id.
5. Simko v. Blake, 532 N.W.2d 842, 846 (Mich. 1995).
6. Darby & Darby, P.C. v. VSI Intl., Inc., 739 N.E.2d 744, 747-48 (N.Y. 2000); see
also Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 17.7, 509 (4th ed., West
Publg. Co. 1996).
7. Bernstein v. Oppenheim & Co., P.C., 554 N.Y.S.2d 487, 489-90 (App. Div. 1990).
8. Simko, 532 N.W.2d at 846.
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degree of skill and knowledge possessed by those attorneys who
practice in that specialty." 9
III. ELEMENTS OF APPELLATE MALPRACTICE
The elements of legal malpractice pertaining to appellate
review are the same as for other claims of attorney negligence.
To prevail in an appellate malpractice action, a plaintiff must
show 1) that the lawyer had a duty to the client based on the
existence of the attorney-client relationship; 2) that the lawyer
breached the duty by negligent act or omission; 3) that the
lawyer's breach of duty was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury; and 4) that the plaintiff suffered a legally
cognizable injury.'
A. Proof of Duty
The existence of a bona fide lawyer-client relationship is
generally accepted as confirmation that the lawyer has a duty to
the client." As a result, the first element of an appellate
malpractice case is often the easiest one for a plaintiff to prove.
Occasionally, courts have been willing to find a duty owed to a
non-client when that party is an intended third party beneficiary
of an attorney-client relationship. 12 However, the courts that
have recognized such limited liability to a non-client have
consistently held that legal malpractice claims are not assignable
9. Duffey Law Office, S.C. v. Tank Trans., Inc., 535 N.W.2d 91, 95 (Wis. App. 1995).
10. David J. Meiselman, Attorney Malpractice: Law and Procedure § 3.1, 39-40 (Law.
Co-op. Pubig. Co. 1980).
11. Simko, 532 N.W.2d at 846 ("In legal malpractice actions, a duty exists as a matter
of law if there is an attorney client relationship.").
12. Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Salter, 717 S.2d 141, 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
("To bring a legal malpractice action, the plaintiff must either be in privity with the
attorney ... or the plaintiff must be an intended (not incidental) third-party beneficiary.");
see also McLane v. Russell, 546 N.E.2d 499, 502 (I11. 1989) (same); Cal. Pub. Employees'
Retirement Sys. v. Sherman & Sterling, 741 N.E.2d 101, 104 (N.Y. 2000) (same). Cf.
Moransais v. Heathman, 744 S.2d 973, 977 (Fla. 1999) ("Florida recognizes a cause of
action based on professional negligence against an individual professional who did not
personally contract with the aggrieved party, but who is an employee of the professional
services corporation that did contract with the aggrieved party." ).
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because of the personal and confidential nature of the attorney-
client relationship.1
3
B. Proof of Negligence
Proving breach of duty, however, is often more difficult.
The courts generally require the plaintiff to present expert
testimony to prove breach of duty unless the reason for the
breach is so obvious that it is within the average juror's
competence to decide if the conduct was unreasonable.' 4 For
example, obvious errors, such as failing to file a suit within the
time allowed by the statute of limitations, may not require an
expert's evidence. 5
On the other hand, malpractice claims based on the
lawyer's strategic decisions about a case will generally require
another attorney with knowledge of that area of the law to opine
that a particular act or omission fell below the standard of care
to be expected of practitioners in that field. Thus, where a client
brought an appellate malpractice claim against a lawyer who
failed to raise certain requested federal constitutional issues in
the appellate brief, the state appellate court ruled that the
plaintiff failed to prove malpractice because no expert testimony
was presented to show that the lawyer failed to use a reasonable
degree of skill and care in the representation. On the contrary, a
constitutional law expert testified on behalf of the lawyer,
stating that the issues raised and argued on appeal by the lawyer
were far more likely to succeed than the ones suggested by the
client."
13. See Natl. Union, 717 S.2d at 142.
14. RTC Mortg. Trust v. Fidelity Natl. Title Ins. Co., 58 F. Supp. 2d 503, 524 (D.N.J.
1999) (quoting with approval Sommers v. McKinney, 670 A.2d 99, 104 (N.J. Super., App.
Div. 1996), where the court held that "the facts of a given case may be such that a
layperson's common knowledge is sufficient to permit a finding that the duty of care has
been breached").
15. Little v. Matthewson, 442 S.E.2d 567, 571 (N.C. App. 1994) ("Where no issue is
raised as to defendant's responsibility for allowing the statute of limitations to run, where
the negligence of defendant is apparent and undisputed, and where the record discloses
obvious and explicit carelessness in defendant's failure to meet the duty of care owed by
him to plaintiff, the court will not require expert testimony to define further that which is
already abundantly clear.") (quoting House v. Maddox, 360 N.E.2d 580, 584 (I1. 1977)).
16. Randall v. Bantz, Gosch, Cremer, Peterson & Sommers, 883 F. Supp. 449, 450
(D.S.D. 1995). The client had specifically requested that the issues be raised to preserve the
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C. Proximate Cause and Injury: Loss of a Winning Cause or
Loss of Access?
Proving that the appellate lawyer's breach of duty was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury can also be difficult.
Most courts require the plaintiff to prove that "but for" the
lawyer's negligence, the case would have succeeded on appeal.'7
The degree of proof that courts require to prove "but for"
causation varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.'8 A small
minority of courts require a plaintiff to establish with
"certainty" that but for the attorney's negligence a more
favorable result would have been achieved.'9 Others demand a
lesser showing of "probability" and apply a "substantial factor"
standard to establish causation. 0 Regardless of the degree of
proof required, the rule in these jurisdictions requires some
showing that the malpractice plaintiff would have succeeded in
the underlying appeal.
Other courts, however, hold that merely defaulting on a
plaintiff's appellate claim is itself actionable. A prime example
is Cincinnati Insurance Company v. Byers." A lawyer was sued
in state court for appellate malpractice after an appeal was
dismissed for failure to file the trial transcript and record on
appeal within the time frame permitted by the court. After
removal to federal court, the trial judge granted the lawyer's
motion for summary judgment because the former client failed
to establish that the appeal would have been successful on the
merits. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that the state supreme
right to file for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court in the event of an
unsuccessful appeal. After the appeal was denied in the state court, the client was unable to
petition for certiorari because the constitutional issues had not been raised.
17. See e.g. Patterson v. Swarr, May, Smith & Anderson, 473 N.W.2d 94, 101 (Neb.
1991); Carmel v. Clapp & Eisenberg, 960 F.2d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 1992); Pickard v.
Turner, 592 S.2d 1016, 1019 (Ala. 1992); St. Pierre v. Washofsky, 391 S.2d 78, 79 (La. Ct.
App. 1980).
18. Meiselman, supra n. 10, § 3.3, 42-43.
19. Id. See e.g. Coon v. Ginsberg, 509 P.2d 1293, 1295 (Colo. App. 1973).
20. Meiselman, supra n. 10, § 3.3, 43 (stating that the majority view is represented by
Maryland Cas. Co., 231 F. at 401 (holding, to recover in a suit against an attorney, "the
plaintiff must prove ... such negligence resulted in and was the proximate cause of' loss)).
See also RTC Mortg. Trust, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 526 (explaining that the New Jersey Supreme
Court has held that the substantial factor test should be applied).
21. 151 F.3d 574, 579 (6th Cir. 1998).
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court "explicitly rejected the notion that a plaintiff asserting a
claim for legal malpractice is required in all instances to prove
that the plaintiff would have prevailed in the underlying
proceeding giving rise to the action."22 The court of appeals
remanded in order to allow appellant to pursue a claim based on
the "lost settlement opportunity" resulting from dismissal of the
appeal in the state action.23
Another plaintiff-friendly approach is to put the burden of
proving whether or not the appeal would have prevailed on the
appellate lawyer who defaulted. For example, an appellate
malpractice claim was filed for a lawyer's failure to timely file
an appellate brief, which resulted in dismissal of the appeal.24
While the malpractice case was pending in federal district court,
the state supreme court ruled that the "but for" requirement of a
legal malpractice claim is too harsh on plaintiffs, and that it was
more logical to "impose on the negligent attorney ... the burden
of going forward with evidence ... proving that the client could
not have succeeded on the original claim."25
D. Accrual of a Cause of Action
The jurisdictions are in conflict regarding when the legal
injury to the plaintiff occurs and the cause of action arises.
Generally, to sustain an action in negligence, the plaintiff is
required to prove actual and redressable harm or injury.26 This
means that the injury cannot be merely speculative or
22. Id.
23. Cf. Lawrence W. Kessler, Alternative Liability in Litigation Malpractice Actions:
Eradicating the Last Resort of Scoundrels, 37 San Diego L. Rev. 401 (2000) (presenting a
detailed argument for malpractice recovery against a litigation attorney who acts
unreasonably, regardless of whether plaintiff can prove that he would have won at trial).
His article argues that the causation defense, "the greatest barrier for those who have
received inadequate professional services," should be replaced or supplemented with
alternative doctrines of (1) the substantial factor test, (2) the burden-switching technique
and (3) the loss of chance valuation of damages. Id. at 406-407. In principle, the same
arguments should apply on appeal.
24. Cabot, Cabot & Forbes Co. v. Brian, Simon, Peragine, Smith & Redfearn, 568 F.
Supp. 371, 372 (E.D. La. 1983).
25. Id. at 373 (quoting Jenkins v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 422 S.2d 1109, 1110
(La. 1982)).
26. Porter v. Ogden, Newell & Welch, 241 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11 th Cir. 2001) (Florida
law "drawls] a distinction between knowledge of actual harm from legal malpractice and
knowledge of potential harm").
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conjectural.2 7  The practical effect of the actual injury
requirement is that the cause of action does not accrue for
limitations purposes until the injured party knows or should
know of it.28 Thus, under Florida Statutes § 95.11, the cause of
action accrues for statute of limitation purposes from the "time
the cause of action is discovered or should have been
discovered" with the exercise of due diligence.
In the context of litigation based malpractice, the cause of
action does not accrue until the final judgment is rendered
because prior to final judgment, injury is merely speculative. 9 In
cases that proceed to a final judgment, "[t]he ...statute of
limitations for litigation-related malpractice ... begins to run
when final judgment becomes final," not when the verdict was
rendered or the negligent acts or omissions occurred.3 ° Thus,
where counsel was negligent in rejecting settlement offers
without consulting the client, the statute of limitations did not
run until conclusion of the underlying litigation." Finality also
requires conclusion of appellate review if the adverse judgment
is appealed.32
However, in a malpractice action based on transactional
representation, "redressable harm is not established until the
documents or legal items fail to achieve their designated
27. Giambrone v. Bank of N.Y., 677 N.Y.S.2d 608, 609 (App. Div., 2d Dept. 1998)
("Mere speculation about a loss resulting from an attorney's alleged omission is
insufficient to sustain a primafacie case of legal malpractice.").
28. See Porter, 241 F.3d at 1339 ("Florida courts hold that a malpractice action accrues
when it is reasonably clear that the client has actually suffered some damage from legal
advice or services.") (quoting Throneburg v. Boose, Casey, Ciklin, Lubitz, Martens,
McBride & O'Connell, P.A., 659 S.2d 1134, 1136 (Fla. App. 1995)).
29. Porter, at 1338 ("When a plaintiff bases a malpractice action on errors committed
in the course of litigation, and the litigation proceeds to judgment, the redressable harm is
not established until final judgment.").
30. Silverstone v. Edell, 721 S.2d 1173, 1175 (Fla. 1998).
31. See Fremont Indem. Co. v. Carey, Dwyer, Eckhart, Mason & Spring, P.A., 796
S.2d 504 (Fla. 2001).
32. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane, 565 S.2d 1323, 1325 (Fla. 1990) ("A clear
majority of the [Florida] district courts [of appeals] have expressly held that a cause of
action for legal malpractice does not accrue until the underlying legal proceeding has been
completed on appellate review because, until that time, one cannot determine if there was
any actionable error by the attorney.") See also Watkins v. Gilbride Heller & Brown, P.A.,
783 S.2d 224, 225 (Fla. 2001) (statute of limitations did not begin to run until after the
supreme court's resolution of client's petition for writ of certiorari in the underlying case).
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purpose." 33 In transactional representation, it is possible for the
client to suffer a concrete injury prior to a court holding that
written instruments created during representation "fail to
achieve their designated purpose."34 The actual injury can be
shown by a client suffering additional expenses to remedy the
deficiencies in the instruments that give rise to the malpractice
claim.
An exception to the accrual of a cause of action is the
continuous representation doctrine.35  The continuous
representation rule "tolls the running of the Statute of
Limitations on the malpractice claim until the ongoing
representation is completed."3 6 The continuous representation
doctrine is applicable in both litigation and transactional
contexts. In litigation-based malpractice, the continuous
representation rule tolls the statute of limitations until all trial
and appellate litigation in the underlying case is complete,37 or
until the attorney is replaced in the litigation of the underlying
case.38  In a transactional setting, under the continuous
representation doctrine the statute of limitations would be tolled
until representation in the transaction which gave rise to the
cause of action is completed. 9
33. Porter, 241 F.3d at 1339.
34. Id.
35. Shumsky v. Eisenstein, 750 N.E.2d 67, 69 (N.Y. 2001) (noting that an "action to
recover damages for legal malpractice accrues when the malpractice is committed" unless
continuous representation doctrine applies).
36. Glamm v. Allen, 439 N.E.2d 390, 393 (N.Y. 1982).
37. Jacobsen v. Haugen, 529 N.W.2d 882, 885 (N.D. 1995) (continuous representation
doctrine "tolls the statute of limitations or defers accrual of the cause of action while the
attorney continues to represent the client" in the underlying litigation).
38. Hampton v. Payne, 600 S.2d 1144, 1146 (Fla. App., 3d Dist. 1992) (holding that
statute of limitations began to run when client replaced her attorney in the underlying
litigation; client could no longer avail herself of the continuous representation rule once she
replaced her attorney).
39. Zarefv. Berk & Michaels, P.C., 595 N.Y.S.2d 772, 774 (App. Div., 1st Dept. 1993)
(continuous representation applies only in connection with continuation of the particular
transaction that is the subject of the allegation); Boorman v. Bleakley, Platt, Schmidt, Hart
& Fritz, 451 N.Y.S.2d 179, 180 (App. Div., 2d Dept. 1982) (" [Clause of action under th[e]
doctrine of continuous representation does not accrue until the attorney's representation
concerning a particular transaction is terminated.").
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E. Abandonment
Under the theory of abandonment, before bringing a
malpractice action, "a party may be required to pursue an appeal
rather than accept a settlement" on the underlying case that
gives rise to the malpractice action.40 Appellate review of the
underlying case is a safeguard that gives an attorney the
opportunity to cure a nonprejudicial defect that could have been
"judicial error rather than legal malpractice." 4' If a favorable
outcome on appeal could eliminate the injury complained of by
the plaintiff in the malpractice action, the plaintiff will not be
able to establish a redressable injury until the appeal in the
underlying action is terminated.
However, when it is not possible for the alleged
malpractice to be corrected on appeal, the client need not suffer
the additional cost of an adverse judgment on appeal in the
underlying action as a condition precedent to bringing the
malpractice cause of action.43 This is because the redressable
harm is not dependent on the outcome of the litigation, and the
absence of an appeal does not impede review that could
compensate for the injury caused by the malpractice. In such a
case, settlement of the underlying action does not automatically
constitute abandonment of a malpractice claim; there is no rule
that compels the filing of a futile appeal for the client to show
actual redressable injury for a malpractice claim. 44
The theory of abandonment of a legal malpractice claim
has been traditionally narrow, allowed only when an adverse
judgment in the underlying action would likely have been
corrected on appeal. If such is the case, then the malpractice
40. Parker v. Graham & James, 715 S.2d 1047, 1048 (Fla. App., 3d Dist. 1998).
41. Id.
42. Coble v. Aronson, 647 S.2d 968, 970 (Fla. App., 4th Dist. 1994).
43. Id. at 971; see also Parker, 715 S.2d at 1048 (holding that when settlement does not
thwart any review process that would cure malpractice, settlement of appeal does not
constitute abandonment of malpractice claim); Segall v. Segall, 632 S.2d 76, 78 (Fla. App.,
3d Dist. 1994) ("We are unable to establish a bright line rule that complete appellate
review of the underlying litigation is a condition precedent to every legal malpractice
action.").
44. Hunzinger Constr. Corp. v. Quarles & Bradley, 735 S.2d 589, 594-95 (Fla. App.,
4th Dist. 1999).
45. Eastman v. Flor-Ohio, Ltd., 744 S.2d 499, 503 (Fla. 1999) (quoting with approval
Lenahan v. Russell L. Forkey, P.A., 702 S.2d 610, 611 (Fla. App., 4th Dist. 1993): "[T]he
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action is considered "abandoned if a final appellate decision is
not obtained." 
4 6
F. Criminal Cases
In the criminal context, a defendant's usual recourse for
deficient representation will be habeas corpus or other collateral
attack based on ineffective assistance of counsel.47 However, in
some limited circumstances, even a criminal defendant might
have a civil cause of action for damages against a defense
attorney for legal malpractice. The burden of establishing the
lawyer's negligence as the proximate cause of the underlying
conviction requires the defendant to win appellate or
post-conviction relief.48 In other words, the conviction must be
overturned or the defendant must be exonerated in order for him
to prove that "but for" the attorney's negligence, there would
not have been an underlying conviction to begin with.
IV. MISTAKES THAT LEAD TO APPELLATE MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
As the preceding cases illustrate, the grounds for appellate
malpractice claims vary, and are generally tied to the failure of
counsel to perfect or present certain aspects of a client's appeal.
Defaults include failing to file a timely appeal, failing to raise an
issue on appeal, and failure to transmit the record on appeal.
A. Failure to Raise an Issue on Appeal
One of the most common potentially actionable errors
dismissal or settlement of a related case, or the failure to take an appeal of the underlying
lawsuit, will [not] automatically translate into an inability to establish redressable harm.").
46. Segall, 632 S.2d at 78.
47. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment imposes a standard of reasonable competence in determining ineffective
assistance of counsel in the trial or sentencing of a criminal case). The same standard
applies to the first appeal as of right in a criminal case. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396
(1985).
48. Steele v. Kehoe, 747 S.2d 931, 933 (Fla. 1999) ("A majority of jurisdictions have
held that appellate or postconviction relief is a prerequisite to maintaining [an] action [for
legal malpractice]."); Britt v. Legal Aid Socy., Inc., 741 N.E.2d 109, 112 (N.Y. 2000)
(same).
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made is the failure of counsel to raise an issue on appeal. A
lawyer is expected to use his professional judgment in assessing
the merits of a case. In deciding which issues to appeal, the
lawyer should be selective and not appeal every conceivable
issue.49 Even if a lawyer is negligent in failing to raise an issue
on appeal, however, such an omission will not be actionable
unless the client can prove that injury resulted from it.
Thus, where a client who was sued for fees by his former
attorney counterclaimed for malpractice based on failure to raise
an issue on appeal, the appellate court affirmed the grant of the
defense motion for summary judgment. The court held that the
issue that the client sought to raise was not a valid one, and its
omission therefore could not support an action for malpractice
based on the lawyer's failure to follow the instructions of the
client.5 ° Similarly, failing to raise an issue on appeal is not
malpractice if the issue was correctly decided in the lower
court." In a case where the client claimed that the lawyer failed
to raise and argue the propriety of a trial court restitution order,
the court ruled that the client failed to show any connection
between the lawyer's negligence and actual damage, i.e., that
"but for" the alleged omissions and negligence of the lawyer,
the client would not have been ordered to pay restitution."
B. Failure to Timely File an Appeal
Appellate malpractice based on the failure to timely file an
appeal is another common ground of malpractice suits. Thus, the
plaintiff prevailed in his malpractice action based on a failure to
file an appeal because he showed that had appeal been timely
filed it would have been successful. 3
Conversely, failure to file a timely appeal of a dismissal is
not grounds for action if the underlying case would not have
49. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983).
50. Trustees of Schools v. Schroeder, 278 N.E.2d 431, 435 ([11. App., 1st Dist. 1971).
51. Senise v. Mackasek, 642 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242 (App. Div., 1st Dept. 1996).
52. Id.
53. Cree Oil Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 653 S.2d 620, 629 (La. App., 3d Cir. 1995). The
court found that the trial court erred in holding the oil company liable, and ruled that had
the appeal been taken, the oil company would have been relieved of its liability. Because
the oil company showed that it could have prevailed on appeal, the appellate lawyer was
found to be negligent.
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succeeded.14 Thus, the grant of a defense motion for summary
judgment was affirmed where the plaintiff client did not show
that the lawyer's untimely filing of the appeal was the proximate
cause of any injury because the underlying claim was not
cognizable under federal or state law and was therefore doomed
to fail.55 Similarly, another court held that a lawyer was not
liable for appellate malpractice, even if he was negligent in
failing to file timely the notice of appeal, because the client
could not have recovered on the underlying action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and a variety of other
torts.56
C. Other Failures to Perfect an Appeal
Many blunders that lead to appellate malpractice claims are
easily avoidable mistakes that arise when lawyers ignore or
overlook the rules that must be followed on appeal. 7 Although
in many of the cases cited, the errors or omissions were not
enough to overcome the plaintiff's burden of proving his or her
claim, 8 it is important to note that the mishandling of these
issues resulted in the costs and inconvenience of defending a
claim. This generally means notifying the malpractice liability
carrier and suffering increases in future premiums.
1. Failure to File Record on Appeal or Brief
A lawyer filed the client's notice of appeal on time, but
failed to timely file the brief and record on appeal. Two years
54. Natl. Wrecking Co. v. Spangler, Jennings, Spangler & Dougherty, 782 F.2d 101,
102 (7th Cir. 1985).
55. Id. at 106.
56. Kunau v. Pillers, Pillers & Pillers, P.C., 404 N.W.2d 573, 576-577 (Iowa App.
1987).
57. In McAlister v. Slosberg, 658 A.2d 658, 659-60 (Me. 1995), the client hired the
attorney to represent him on appeal in reliance on the attorney's representation that "he had
a thirty percent chance of prevailing." Two years later, the client learned that the appeal
had been dismissed because the attorney failed to file an appellate brief.
58. Id. at 660. The complaint contained "no allegation nor did he offer any evidence
that, absent the misconduct by Slosberg, he would have been successful on the appeal ...
[the client) merely alleged in his complaint that he suffered 'the lost opportunity which
may have resulted in prevailing on the appeal' .... [T]he trial court properly granted a
judgment as a matter of law in favor of [the lawyer] on this claim."
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later, the attorney sought permission to file them, but the court
found no valid reason to excuse the delay. Although the court
found that the lawyer was guilty of negligence as a matter of
law, it held that he was not liable because the appeal would not
have been successful even if it had been brought.59
2. Failure to File Required Documents
An appellate lawyer filed a timely notice of appeal, but
then failed to file certain required documents. As a result, the
client's appeal was dismissed. The court recognized that the
client had lost the opportunity to appeal because of the lawyer's
negligence, but it determined that an appellate court would not
have reversed or reached a more favorable judgment on the
underlying claim.6 °
3. Certification of Incomplete Transcript as Correct
An appellate attorney certified a transcript on appeal as
correct and later realized that it did not contain testimony from
the suppression hearing in the underlying criminal case. The
appellate attorney filed a motion seeking a writ from the court
directing the court reporter to file a transcript of her notes with
the court, but the motion was denied. The client's conviction
was subsequently upheld by a per curiam affirmance. He then
filed an appellate malpractice suit alleging that his appeal on the
merits was rejected because of the missing suppression hearing
testimony. The court held that the per curiam affirmance
indicated the appeal had no merit, and that the client was not
prejudiced by the missing testimony.6
4. Failure to Print Record on Appeal
A plaintiff alleged that her appellate lawyers failed to
59. Katsaris v. Scelsi, 453 N.Y.S.2d 994, 996-998 (Sup. Ct. 1982). See also McAlister,
658 A.2d at 660 (failure to file brief and lying about appeal pending); Bryant v. Seagraves,
526 P.2d 1027, 1028 (Or. 1974) (failure to file abstract of record or brief); Kilmer v.
Carter, 78 Cal. Rptr. 800, 805 (2d App. Dist., Div. 5 1969) (failure to file brief).
60. Jones v. Psimos, 882 F.2d 1277, 1284 (7th Cir. 1989).
61. Stewart v. Walls, 534 S.2d 1033, 1035 (Miss. 1988). See also Welder v. Mercer,
448 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Ark. 1970) (failure to obtain and file transcript).
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perfect an appeal of a divorce order because the time for appeal
expired without the required printing of the record. The court
found no merit in the plaintiff's claim because the client failed
to advance the funds required to cover the costs of printing the
record after she was contacted repeatedly. As a result of the
client's inaction, the time for perfecting the appeal expired.62
D. Failure to Notify Client
Failing to perfect the appeal or raise a meritorious issue on
appeal is not the only way in which appellate counsel can
commit malpractice. In one case, appellate counsel was paid
$15,000 to undertake an appeal and did so successfully.
However, after winning reversal and remand on the issue of
damages, he failed to notify his client of the victory. No
proceedings on remand were pursued, and five years later
judgment was entered against the client. The client sued
appellate counsel. The trial court dismissed but the appellate
court reversed, holding that the complaint was sufficient to state
causes of action in negligence and breach of contract."
V. DEFENSE: THE HONEST EXERCISE OF PROFESSIONAL
JUDGMENT
Not every mistake made by an appellate lawyer constitutes
actionable malpractice. An appellate lawyer must exercise
professional judgment on a wide range of issues in the course of
appellate representation. The lawyer must decide whether to file
an appeal, which issues to raise on appeal, and how to structure
and argue the case. Courts have consistently held that a lawyer's
honest, professional judgments made to advance the client's
case are protected from malpractice claims.64 Such professional
62. Frist v. Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, 433 F.2d 11, 12 (4th Cir. 1970) (per
curiam).
63. See Perkovic v. Barrett, 671 A.2d 740, 744 (Pa. Super. 1996). While upholding a
cause of action for failure to notify, the court rejected plaintiffs' claim that appellate
counsel had a duty of continued representation after remand under the fee agreement for
the appeal.
64. Simko, 532 N.W.2d at 847 ("Where an attorney acts in good faith and in honest
belief that his acts and omissions are well founded in law and are in the best interest of his
client, he is not answerable for mere errors in judgment.").
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judgments include choice of trial tactics and decisions made
about how to conduct a case.65
This rule is offset by the fact that the lawyer must always
be sure to exercise a reasonable degree of skill and care in all
dealings on behalf of the client.66 In sum, an appellate
malpractice claim is not likely to be actionable if it is based on
an unfavorable outcome resulting from an appellate lawyer's
honest exercise of professional judgment. Second-guessing the
appellate attorney's judgment, or surmising what another
attorney might have done under similar circumstances, is
insufficient to prove an appellate malpractice claim.
The following examples demonstrate that a lawyer's honest
exercise of professional judgment succeeded as a defense to a
claim for appellate malpractice.
A. Failure to File Cross-Appeal
In Burk v. Burzynski,67 the plaintiff claimed that the
lawyer's failure to file a cross-appeal constituted appellate
malpractice. The lawyer testified that he exercised his best
professional judgment in deciding not to cross-appeal, because
he believed it would be too costly for the client and would
damage the arguments made on behalf of the client at trial and
on appeal. The plaintiff provided no expert testimony that filing
a cross-appeal in such a case was the standard of due care. The
court held that no cause of action existed against the lawyer
because, although he may have made errors in judgment in
litigating the case, the errors arose from his professional
judgment as to how to best handle the case."
B. Failure to Raise Issue on Appeal
In Holmberg, Galbraith, Holmberg, Orkin & Bennett v.
Koury,69 the court held that an appellate lawyer's strategic
decisions or mistakes of judgment during the handling of a
65. Id.
66. Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 930 (6th Cir. 1980).
67. 672 P.2d 419 (Wyo. 1983).
68. Id. at 427.
69. 575 N.Y.S.2d 192, 194 (App. Div., 3d Dept. 1991).
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client's appeal did not constitute appellate malpractice. In
Koury, a plaintiff attorney brought an action to recover legal
fees, and the defendant client counterclaimed, seeking damages
for appellate malpractice. The client argued that the attorney
failed to raise certain issues on appeal, and that the attorney
"failed to give an aggressive, interesting, creative, and
convincing oral argument."70 The court held that the brief filed
was "prepared after an adequate investigation of the facts and
research of the law, and the relevant issues were raised in the
brief."" The court found that the lawyer's conduct was "a
strategic decision, or at most, a mistake of judgment."72
C. Failure to Understand Unsettled Law
It is generally recognized that mistakes in judgment that
arise from a misunderstanding of an unsettled area of law are not
actionable as legal malpractice.73 In Buchanan v. Young,74 the
court considered whether the dismissal of an appeal constituted
malpractice in a case where an appellate lawyer miscalculated
the tolling effect of motions for JNOV or for new trial on the
time for filing the notice of appeal. The court found that the
lawyer's miscalculation was reasonable because the law on the
issue was not settled at the time that the appeal was filed. The
court held that a lawyer cannot be held liable for malpractice
based on an error in judgment arising from unsettled law.
To the contrary, in DeBiasi v. Snaith,75 the court found
malpractice despite the ambiguity in the rules of procedure. The
lawyer mistakenly believed that the appellate rules allowed
motions for rehearing, clarification, or certification to be filed
serially, and that the fifteen-day time limit would not be tolled
until each successive motion was ruled upon. The lawyer filed
timely motions for clarification, rehearing, and rehearing en
banc, which were denied. The lawyer then filed a subsequent
motion for certification within fifteen days of that denial. That
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Mallen & Smith, supra n. 6, § 17.1, 497-99.
74. 534 S.2d 263, 264-65 (Ala. 1988).
75. 732 S.2d 14, 16 (Fla. App., 4th Dist. 1999).
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motion was denied as untimely. The client then brought the
malpractice action against the lawyer. The court held that a
"mere 'ambiguity of a rule' of procedure, without more, does
not equate to the somewhat more amorphous realm of 'fairly
debatable' or 'unsettled area of the law' to which the doctrine of
judgmental immunity is applied."76
VI. APPELLATE COUNSEL'S DUTY TO INFORM A CLIENT OF A
POTENTIAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM AGAINST THE TRIAL LAWYER
In a 1981 Informal Opinion, the American Bar Association
responded to an inquiry concerning the duty of an appellate
counsel to advise a client that a civil cause of action for
malpractice against trial counsel was appropriate.77 In the ABA's
view, the rules neither prohibited nor required the advice. The
opinion stated, however, that it would be appropriate for
appellate counsel to advise the client of the potential claim
against trial counsel, because Ethical Consideration 2-2 urged
lawyers to assist lay persons in recognizing legal problems
which may not be self-revealing or timely noticed.8
In 1989, the Illinois State Bar Association took a stronger
position on the issue.79 A hypothetical question involved an
appellate lawyer who was retained to represent an appellant who
was appealing an adverse judgment in a civil action for the death
of a minor struck by a drunken driver. The inquiry was whether
the appellate lawyer had a duty to disclose to the client the
potential malpractice claim against the trial lawyer based on a
discovery that the trial lawyer failed to name a potential
defendant in the lawsuit within the statute of limitations.
In the State Bar's view, the appellate counsel had a duty to
disclose the trial lawyer's potential malpractice, because failure
76. Id.
77. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof. Responsibility, Informal Op. 1465 (1981).
78. See Richard Klein, Legal Malpractice, Professional Discipline, and Representation
of the Indigent Defendant, 61 Temple L. Rev. 1171, 1203 (1988). The article, citing ABA
Informal Opinion 1465, asserted that an appellate lawyer representing a criminal defendant
on appeal may have an ethical obligation to inform the defendant of the right to file a
malpractice action against the trial lawyer. But see Steele, 747 S.2d at 933 (noting that
"appellate, postconviction, and habeas corpus remedies are available to address ineffective
assistance of counsel"); see also n. 48, supra, and accompanying text.
79. See I1l. St. Bar Assn. Advisory Op. 88-11 (1989).
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to do so could clearly damage the client. The Bar based its
opinion on Illinois Rule 7-101(a)(3). The rule stated in part that
"a lawyer shall not prejudice or damage a client during the
course of a professional relationship." The State Bar also
determined that the duty continued even after the representation
ended. In affirming the opinion, the Board of Governors relied
on Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct 1.4(b) and 2.1. Rule
1.4(b) stated that "a lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation." Rule 2.1 stated that "a
lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgement and
render candid advice."
Another writer has addressed the issue of a lawyer's ethical
obligation to disclose the malpractice of prior counsel, within a
broader discussion of the entire controversy doctrine.8° The
article concluded that if the new lawyer finds that the client has
a malpractice action against prior counsel, the new lawyer is
obligated to inform the client. The author found this duty in
several Rules of Professional Conduct:8' the duty of loyalty and
competence to the client; the duty to keep the client reasonably
informed about the status of the matter; and the duty to explain
matters to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to
make informed decisions.82
80. See Nancy J. Moore, Implications of Circle Chevrolet for Attorney Malpractice and
Attorney Ethics, 28 Rutgers L.J. 57 (1996) (appearing in Symposium: Entire Controversy
Doctrine).
81. Id. at 64. The author cited New Jersey Rules'of Professional Conduct 1.7 (conflict
of interests), 1.1 (competence), and 1.4(a) and (b) (communication). To support her
conclusion, she also cited I11. Advisory Op. 88-1I, supra n. 79, ABA Informal Opinion
1465, supra n. 77, and Pa. St. Bar Op. 88-225, which concluded that an appellate lawyer
who discovers malpractice by the trial lawyer must inform the client (1) that the case was
dismissed as a result of the trial lawyer's lateness under the statute of limitations and (2)
that the client may have a legal malpractice claim against the trial lawyer.
82. Moore, supra n. 80. The author also considered whether the new lawyer had an
affirmative duty to search for possible malpractice of the trial lawyer when it was not
apparent and whether the new lawyer could limit the scope of representation to avoid
investigation and disclosure of the original lawyer's malpractice. She answered both
questions in the affirmative. Id. at 70-71.
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VII. BREACH OF CONTRACT AS AN ALTERNATIVE CAUSE OF
ACTION
Breach of contract is widely recognized as an alternative or
supplement to the typical negligence claim for attorney default
or misfeasance." Indeed, the contract claim developed first:
Professional malpractice has its origins in contract law.
Initially, the professional was viewed as breaching his or
her professional duties under a contractual relationship of
privity with the client. When contract theories failed to
provide a good justification to permit an award for bodily
injury damages, particularly in medical malpractice, the
cause of action evolved into a negligence theory.84
As medical malpractice jurisprudence evolved from its
contractual basis into the tort theory of negligence, so did other
types of professional malpractice, including attorney
malpractice. Still, a cause of action for breach of contract is
viable for some attorney malpractice claims,85 even though
"[t]ort law has traditionally provided the primary means for
resolving claims of attorney malpractice."86
Part of the reason negligence has become the favored cause
of action for attorney malpractice is because of the common
difficulty in establishing the express terms of the contract
necessary to define the duty breached. For an express contract to
come into existence, the attorney must agree "to perform a
specific service or act in a particular manner. 87 If appellate
counsel simply fails to perform at all, a clear-cut case of breach
of contract can be shown. This may arise where the attorney
defaulted on the agreement to take a timely appeal, or to perfect
83. E.g. Gunn v. Mahoney, 408 N.Y.S.2d 896, 900 (Sup. Ct., Erie County 1978)
("inartfully drawn" complaint framed separate claims on two causes of action: breach of
contract and negligence which is tortious in nature).
84. Monroe v. Sarasota County Sch. Bd., 746 S.2d 530, 535 (Fla. App., 2d Dist. 1999).
85. Collins v. Reynard, 607 N.E.2d 1185, 1186 (I1. 1992) ("Today we rule that a
complaint against a lawyer for professional malpractice may be couched in either contract
or tort and that recovery may be sought in the alternative.").
86. Id. at 1188 (Miller, C.J., concurring).
87. Mallen & Smith, supra n. 6, § 769, 555.
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an appeal which was dismissed as a result.88 But if the claimed
error or omission is of a more subtle nature involving the quality
of the representation, there will often be no specific term of the
contract that was breached. This will present an obstacle to
bringing an action for breach of contract for the defectiveappelate • 89
appellate representation.
If it is necessary for the plaintiff to argue that the contract
for appellate representation implies terms of ordinary skill and
knowledge, it is the functional equivalent of arguing negligence.
In such cases, the two theories of recovery converge.
No matter how the undertaking to exercise ordinary skill
and knowledge is characterized, the essential claim is for
legal malpractice. The theories share the same facts and,
except for the effect of certain defenses, such as the statute
of limitations, usually reach the same result.90
For example, in a case where appellate counsel failed to raise a
potential claim on appeal, there would ordinarily be no specific
contractual clause or term breached to allege as a basis for a suit
in contract.9' A suit for breach of contract would have to allege
that the lawyer's undertaking on appeal implied the use of
ordinary skill, and that such implied promise was breached. In
such a case, the essence of the claim has reverted to the
88. Pelton v. Andrews, 74 P.2d 528, 530 (Cal. App., 2d Dist., Div. 2 1937) (an
allegation that an attorney "failed to perform" may be deemed to sound in contract and not
negligence).
89. See Busk v. Flanders, 468 P.2d 695, 697 (Wash. App., Div. 1 1970) (indicating that
in an alleged contract breach, the court will look to see if the written document relied upon
contains some guaranteed or promised result); Corceller v. Brooks, 347 S.2d 274, 277-78
(La. App., 4th Cir. 1977) (warning that the plaintiff in a legal malpractice action will have
a difficult time establishing a breach of promise in the absence of an explicit promise in an
express contract that has been breached); Pacesetter Commun. Corp. v. Solin & Breindel,
P.C., 541 N.Y.S.2d 404, 406 (App. Div., 1st Dept. 1989) (stating that a "breach of contract
claim against an attorney based on a retainer agreement may be sustained only where the
attorney makes an express promise in the agreement to obtain a specific result and fails to
do so").
90. Mallen & Smith, supra n. 6, § 8.1, 556-57. Considerations that may affect the
choice between suing in negligence or contract include differing statute of limitations
periods, see Linder v. Eichel, 232 N.Y.S.2d 240, 245 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1962),
whether a chose in action may be assigned, see Goodman & Mitchell v. Walker, 30 Ala.
482, 497 (1857), and the measure of damages sought, see Farah v. Mafride & Kormanik,
P.C., 927 S.W.2d 663, 674 (Tex. App., 1st Dist. 1996).
91. But cf Randall v. Bantz, Gosch, Cremer, Peterson & Sommers, 883 F. Supp. 449,
450 (D.S.D. 1995) (client specifically requested issues to be raised on appeal).
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functional equivalent of a negligence action because the
requisite proof is a breach of a duty of due care.
Some jurisdictions have created hybrid causes of action by
statute, independent of and encompassing common law contract
and tort liability.92
The once important subject of which theory of liability a
plaintiff in a legal malpractice case should rely upon has
lost much of its impact. Today, the same essential standard
applies regardless of theory and regardless of how the
cause of action is phrased.93
Some scholars further discount the differences between the
alternative theories of liability and even refer to attorney
malpractice as neither contract nor tort, rather "lying in a
'borderland' between the two." 
94
Where there is a choice of tort or contract theory, appellate
malpractice resulting from an attorney's failure to file or to
perfect an appeal may be easier to prove based on breach of
promise instead of negligence. Expert witnesses to testify to the
standard of professional care would not be necessary. The duty
of the attorney to the client is breached in such an obvious way
that the contract claim may well justify a grant of summary
judgment against the defaulting attorney.
The measure of damages recoverable in contract is different
than in tort, but in practice the two theories often yield similar
results. Typical contract damages, or expectation damages, seek
to put the plaintiff in the same position he would have been in
92. E.g. Ala. Code § 6-5-573 (1975):
One form of action.
There shall be only one form and cause of action against legal service providers
in courts in the State of Alabama and it shall be known as the legal service
liability action and shall have the meaning as defined herein.
See also Ala. Code § 6-5-572 (1975):
Definitions.
(1) Legal Services Liability Action. A legal services liability action embraces
any form of action in which a litigant may seek legal redress for a wrong or an
injury and every legal theory of recovery, whether common law or statutory,
available to a litigant in a court in the State of Alabama now or in the future.
93. Meiselman, supra n. 10, § 2.3, 17-18.
94. Busk v. Flanders, 468 P.2d 695, 698 (Wash. App. 1970) (citing William L. Prosser,
The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in Selected Topics on the Law of Torts 380 (West
1954)). See also Peter W. Thornton, The Elastic Concept of Tort and Contract as Applied
by the Courts of New York, 14 Brook. L. Rev. 196 (1948).
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had the contract not been breached. 95 "The expectation interest
is based not on the injured party's hopes at the time he made the
contract, but on the actual value that the contract would have
had to him had it been performed." 96 Damages must be
established with a reasonable degree of certainty. 97 This raises
the question whether the measure of damages should be based
on the value of the appeal if it had succeeded, or merely the out-
of-pocket damages represented by the payment of fees and costs.
Recovery of the latter would make the plaintiff ex ante whole"
but would not confer upon plaintiff the expected value of the
case; the plaintiff would merely be restored to the position he
was in before the breach of contract occurred.
Additional damages based on the value of the underlying
appeal if it had succeeded must be pled and argued as
expectation damages.99 In order to be recoverable, consequential
damages must be a foreseeable result of the breach that created
the cause of action. '°° It is axiomatic that a breaching party
95. E. Allen Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.1, 812-13 (Little, Brown & Co. 1982).
96. Id.
97. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 352 (Am. L. Inst. 1979) (stating the rule:
"Damages are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be
established with reasonable certainty.").
98. Brian A. Blum, Contracts: Examples & Explanations § 18.7, 613 (2d ed., Aspen L.
& Bus. 1998) ("[R]estitution is premised on the theory of disaffirmance-it treats the
breach as having caused the contract to fall away ... [and] seeks to return to the plaintiff
the value of any benefit conferred on the defendant under the breached contract.")
(emphasis in original). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 344 ("Judicial
remedies under the rules stated in this Restatement serve to protect one or more of the
following interests of a promisee .... (c) his 'restitution interest,' which is his interest in
having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the other party." ).
99. Blum, supra n. 98, at 612 ("Although expectation damages are the primary remedy
for breach of contract, they can only be recovered to the extent that the plaintiff can prove
that the breach [resulted in the loss] .... ).
100. See Restatement, supra n. 97, § 351:
(1) Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have
reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was made.
(2) Loss may be foreseeable as a probable result of a breach because it follows
from the breach
(a) in the ordinary course of events, or
(b) as a result of special circumstances, beyond the ordinary course of
events, that the party in breach had reason to know.
(3) A court may limit damages for foreseeable loss by excluding recovery for
loss of profits, by allowing recovery only for loss incurred in reliance, or
otherwise if it concludes that in the circumstances justice so requires in order to
avoid disproportionate compensation.
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cannot be held liable for an injury that was not caused by the
breach. °1 The plaintiff's burden in pleading and proving
consequential damages parallels the burden faced by plaintiff in
a negligence action in establishing that the attorney was the
proximate cause of the damages. '°2
VIII. SUMMARY
It appears that there is a growing tendency for dissatisfied
clients to sue their former attorneys for alleged legal malpractice
at trial or on appeal. While the reported cases often show a
favorable outcome for the attorney, it is reasonable to assume
that many cases of clearer liability were settled without litigation
all the way through a reported appellate opinion. There is no
way to track the number of settlements that have been paid by
counsel or their liability carriers to avoid exposure to valid
claims or simply to avoid the costs of defending weak ones.
Even where counsel may defeat a malpractice claim on the
basis of favorable doctrines of no causation or no injury, the
damage to professional reputation and increase in liability
insurance premiums are things that every practitioner will wish
to avoid to the maximum extent possible. Careful attention to
the fundamentals of appellate practice and the particular
requirements of court rules of appellate procedure is the
solution.
101. See Blum, supra n. 98, at § 18.6.4, 607 ("There must be a link between the breach
and the loss. Causation is not usually an issue when direct damages are concerned ...
[h]owever, consequential damages are by definition more remotely connected to the
breach, and when they are claimed, it must be established that they were indeed a
consequence of the breach.") (emphasis in original).
102. See supra pt. Il1(C). Most courts require a plaintiff to prove that "but for" the
attorney's negligence, the case would have succeeded on appeal; a minority hold that
merely defaulting on a plaintiff's claim is itself actionable. See also Mallen & Smith, supra
n. 6, at §8.4, 581 ("The prevailing rule is that an attorney's negligence need not be the sole
cause of the client's loss. If the wrongful conduct was a substantial factor, it need not be
the sole proximate cause.").

